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The ﬁnal result of political action often, no, even regularly, stands in completely inadequate and often
even paradoxical relation to its original meaning.
Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1918–19)
Hugh Gaitskell (Labour chancellor of the exchequer, 1950–1) remarked in 1957 that ‘pro-
fessional politicians, when they have been in the job for any length of time, are not well
ﬁtted for really deep thinking, partly because they have no time for it and partly because
the very practice of their art involves them in continual simpliﬁcation’.1 This candid
observation has important implications for the study of how past politicians formulated
policy. The books under review all deal with diﬀering aspects of British (and also, in one
case, French) economic and social policy in the twentieth century. They all show, to
varying degrees, that parties, governments, and other political actors have proﬀered
apparently simplistic and muddled solutions to important problems. But was this because
of intellectual deﬁciency on their part, or was it an inevitable consequence of the exercise
of what Rab Butler, Gaitskell’s Conservative successor, famously called ‘ the art of the
possible ’?
Butler and Gaitskell were twinned, in a 1954 article in the Economist, in the composite
ﬁgure of ‘Mr Butskell ’. In what Scott Kelly suggests is the dominant ‘consensualist ’ view of
post-Second World War British politics, Mr Butskell represents the view that there was a
fundamental continuity in policy between the men’s early 1950s chancellorships, particu-
larly through the commitment to maintain full employment via Keynesian demand
management. Kelly concludes that ‘Mr Butskell never really existed … the divergence
between Gaitskell’s vision of a controlled economy and Butler’s of a free one represented a
fundamental disagreement over the aims and methods of economic policy ’ (p. 226). This
is a respectable point of view, which carries a fair amount of conviction. After all, both men
1 Hugh Gaitskell, The challenge of co-existence (London, 1957), p. 7.
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themselves rejected the term ‘Butskellism’. Butler noted in his memoirs that ‘Both of us, it
is true, spoke the language of Keynesianism. But we spoke it with diﬀerent accents and with
a diﬀering emphasis. ’2 And they did indeed have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent attitudes to sterling
convertibility, physical economic controls, and monetary policy.
Kelly’s argument is not, however, very original. As long ago as 1979, Gaitskell’s
biographer Philip Williams attacked ‘the ‘‘Butskellite ’’ myth’. Some subsequent writers
also voiced doubts about the term; and in 1994, Neil Rollings published a seminal article in
Twentieth Century British History developing the anti-Butskellism case yet more strongly.3
There thus appears scant justiﬁcation for Kelly’s claim that ‘ the overwhelming evidence
that no consensus existed has come to be ignored’ (p. 2). Although he makes one passing
reference to ‘attacks by revisionist historians ’ on the idea of consensus, Kelly does not
make clear that he is considerably indebted to the work of these historians, and, in
particular, that of Rollings. Two of the latter’s articles (including the one mentioned above)
are to be found in the bibliography, and one of his book chapters (on Labour’s attitude to
economic controls) is cited in the endnotes. Oddly, though, Rollings is only mentioned in
the text once (p. 92) – in order to record a minor point of disagreement.
It is fair to say, however, that Kelly does extend the scope of his work beyond the areas
on which previous writers have concentrated the bulk of their analysis. He looks brieﬂy at
agricultural policy and, more extensively, at trade issues. He is certainly right that thinking
on trade during this period has tended to receive little attention. His overall argument, as
elsewhere, is that the Conservative accession to power was marked by a sharp break in
policy. By his own account, though, ‘The conversion of the Conservatives from the Party
of Imperial Preference to that of free trade’ (p. 171) only occurred after 1951. At any rate,
also on his own showing, it was not Butler who made the running on this issue. Moreover,
the Attlee government’s attitude to international economic questions had been ambiguous.
It had signed up to the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), an important
liberalizing measure, whilst simultaneously preserving (in a limited form) the preference
system and other restrictive policies. The ambiguity was demonstrated by Gaitskell’s
negotiation with US representatives of the form of the European Payments Union
(EPU) – despite his initial entertainment of profound doubts about the whole idea. He did
secure some signiﬁcant concessions from the Americans, but Kelly’s suggestion that he
successfully countered ‘ the forces driving towards multilateralism’ within the EPU nego-
tiations (p. 229) is a clear exaggeration. In the words of Robert Triﬃn, the man who
devised the initial scheme, the EPU ‘loosened overnight the stranglehold of bilateralism on
intra-European Trade and Payments, and … paved the way toward the resumption of
multilateral trade and currency convertibility. ’4
In his conclusion, Kelly emphasizes ‘ the value of taking what politicians say in public
seriously ’, and suggests that historians should look more closely at parliamentary debates
and public speeches as well as archival records (p. 231). One is obliged to agree whole-
heartedly. This does, though, raise the question of how to deal with these sources, which we
need to take seriously but not at face value. Politicians are virtually bound on public oc-
casions not merely to simplify their own views, but to emphasize as much as possible their
2 Lord Butler, The art of the possible : the memoirs of Lord Butler (London, 1971), p. 160.
3 Neil Rollings, ‘Poor Mr Butskell : a short life wrecked by schizophrenia?’, Twentieth Century British
History, 5 (1994), pp. 183–205.
4 Robert Triﬃn, Europe and the money muddle : from bilateralism to near-convertibility, 1947–1956 (New
Haven, 1957), p. 208.
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diﬀerences with their opponents. This is not to say that such views are not, in some sense,
genuinely held. But ideology develops as much from the vicissitudes of the party struggle as
from rational intellectual processes. This makes it diﬃcult to judge the degree to which
Labour and Tory leaders were, for political purposes, disguising areas of agreement be-
tween them. Kelly does not really acknowledge or tackle these problems. Nevertheless, it is
to be hoped that his book will form pretty much the last word on this particular contro-
versy. Now that Mr Butskell has been shot, poisoned, stabbed, strangled, and buried under
the ice, let the debate move on, before someone else digs him up and tries to kill him again.
Richard Whiting, in his valuable study, notes that ‘ taxation, even in its details, is so
powerfully connected with ultimate political values that it could be not divorced from the
party struggle ’ (p. 1). He identiﬁes two distinct arguments that Labour employed in relation
to tax. One was about the need for ‘greater equality ’ – i.e. redistribution – and the other
was about the requirement for ‘ fairness ’ – i.e. the need to treat income from diﬀerent
sources on an equitable basis by preventing tax avoidance. The two were, of course,
intimately connected, but they were not, Whiting emphasizes, the same thing: ‘The
superimposition of one tax strategy upon another has certainly caused the party problems’
(p. 3). After the Second World War, he argues, the attempt to make the reach of the tax
system more comprehensive (or ‘ fairer ’) consumed an unanticipated amount of reforming
energy, whilst failing to deliver the greater equality that the party expected.
There were, of course, a series of additional complications. Labour not only had to use
the tax system to raise the revenue necessary to pay for its welfare and other programmes,
but it also wanted to use it as a means of regulating the economy. It had to try to do all this
without alienating the electorate (at a time when more and more voters were being drawn
into the income tax system) or the City. The voters themselves, who were increasingly wary
of tax rises, were not easy to please. Labour Party focus group studies in 1996 revealed that
people were sceptical about higher taxes on those earning over £100,000 a year, even if the
money was used to fund a middle-income tax cut from which they themselves would
beneﬁt. Creating a tax regime that was both economically successful and politically pal-
atable (to core supporters as well as waverers) was a tall order.
Moreover, proposals that were technically elegant could run up against the instincts of
the politicians. Whiting demonstrates this in relation to Nicholas Kaldor’s promotion of an
expenditure tax in the 1950s. This was to be a tax assessed on income, minus saving, plus
dis-saving from capital, a calculation that was considered to be a better proxy than income
alone for an individual’s spending power and hence their taxable capacity. Douglas Jay
MP, a close ally of Gaitskell, noted that this was ‘ in many ways the ideal tax, since it
encourages and rewards saving, and discourages spending out of capital ’.5 Yet it was Jay
who was primarily responsible for Labour’s rejection of the idea, to the annoyance of the
party’s economic advisers, who regarded any such opposition as irrational. Jay pointed out
to the Fabian Society’s taxation group that ordinary people liked to have their tax pay-
ments behind them when they thought of spending, not still ahead of them. Whiting quotes
David Worswick, one of the economists present, as saying: ‘When an MP invokes the
British working man or the people, the professional economist has no comeback’ (p. 137).
The idea died. Whiting sees this as a deﬁning moment, as Labour was now condemned to
pursue its aims through an administratively burdensome ‘shopping list ’ of separate taxes.
Nevertheless, one feels a certain amount of sympathy with the politicians’ concerns in
5 Douglas Jay, ‘Labour and tax reform’, British Tax Review (1957), pp. 16–23, at p. 20.
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this instance. Kaldor’s 1966 brainchild, the selective employment tax (SET), was not
considered suﬃciently from the political point of view, proved unpopular, and did not
survive for long.
Political actions and attitudes that seem, from the economist’s point of view, to be
conservative, simplistic, anti-intellectual, and opportunistic are thus not always such a bad
thing. Whiting’s recognition of the salience of the party struggle indicates that he perhaps
appreciates this. He writes that although his book ‘ is a record of few achievements, it
should not be regarded as a study in failure ’ (p. 273). This is because although Labour’s
eﬀorts to devise new taxes and to use the existing ones more eﬀectively were unsuccessful,
the party’s core principle of progressive taxation ‘went largely unchallenged for much of
the century’ (p. 269). Nevertheless, the overall picture he paints is a little too dismal. In
some areas, Labour is due more credit than he is prepared to give – for example in the ﬁeld
of North Sea taxation, which gets only a passing mention. Another slightly disappointing
aspect of the book is that, subtitle notwithstanding, it really only deals with the 1906–79
period, albeit with a brief epilogue on New Labour. These minor complaints aside, this
book is one that virtually everybody interested in the history of Labour’s economic policy
will want to read. Whiting guides the reader through the complexities of tax policy with
aplomb, and his judgements are thought-provoking.
Debates about tax have naturally been closely connected with those about the welfare
state. Howard Glennerster’s useful survey of post-1945 social policy casts some interesting
light on the intersection. The book is a revised and updated version of a work ﬁrst pub-
lished in 1995, a new ﬁnal chapter ‘New labour, new century’ having been added. It is part
of the Institute of Contemporary British History’s series Making Contemporary Britain. The
series is aimed mainly at students, and its purpose is less to break new ground than to
survey the existing state of knowledge. Glennerster meets his brief admirably.
His opening two chapters, dealing respectively with ‘Origins and Myths ’ of the British
welfare state, and with the contribution of William Beveridge, are especially eﬀective. He
ruthlessly dissects some of the absurdities that arose from Beveridge’s determination that
social security should be paid for through national insurance rather than through income
tax. ‘At the heart of Beveridge’s thinking was a contradictory struggle between his deep
desire to cover everything and everyone and his choice of method, contributory insurance
through employment ’ (p. 26). Groups not in the workforce (including large numbers of
women) would not to be able to contribute and would thus not receive automatic en-
titlements. In time of need, they would have to fall back on means-tested national assist-
ance beneﬁts instead.
Glennerster further notes that national insurance was a tax by another name – and a
regressive one at that – and asks why it should have been necessary to have a system for
collecting revenue separate from the ordinary tax system. He points out that, during the
war, the experts of the treasury and the economic section of the cabinet secretariat
wondered likewise. If the insurance fund showed a surplus, they suggested, there would be
a demand for increased social beneﬁts to be paid from it ; but if it showed a deﬁcit, the
treasury would be called upon to make good the shortfall. Furthermore, it was illogical that
the costs of the national health service should fall upon the fund, but not those of education
or family allowances. Practical considerations dictated departure from purely rational
principles, however. Glennerster quotes John Maynard Keynes as follows: ‘ I agree in
theory that employees’ and employers’ contributions are inferior to a charge on general
taxes. On the other hand, it seems to me essential to retain them, at any rate in the ﬁrst
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stages of the new scheme, in order that the additional charges on the Budget may not look
altogether too formidable ’ (p. 29). Beveridge’s contributory principle thus had the useful
political function of disguising the true scope of taxation.
Glennerster oﬀers what he calls a ‘perfectly simple ’ interpretation of the developments
of the 1940s and subsequent decades : ‘ It is that the institutions of the Welfare State were
genuinely popular with the mass of the electorate of all classes for most of our period and it
was this which both brought it into being and sustained it ’ (p. 11). This, though, raises the
question of why they were popular, which does not admit of any particularly straightfor-
ward answer. It is not immediately obvious why voters should have prioritized their liking
for receiving social beneﬁts over their dislike of paying tax; whilst at the same time,
generally, preferring Conservative governments. Undoubtedly, popular feeling placed
important constraints on governments’ abilities to implement apparently logical social
policy solutions. One key instance highlighted by Glennerster is rent control. In a con-
tinuation of wartime measures, the Attlee government kept private rents artiﬁcially low,
giving landlords little incentive to make properties available. Conservative attempts at
decontrol were, given electoral sensitivities, inevitably limited (and in important respects
botched). The number of private landlord dwellings in England and Wales was virtually
cut in half between 1953 and 1971 (p. 78). This outcome would seem, on the face of it, to
have run against the long-term interests of the private tenant class who supported rent
control and whom it was designed to protect.
Glennerster also provides sound treatment of race relations policy, although his cover-
age is mainly restricted to the 1950s and 1960s. Labour politicians, having earlier made
seemingly highly principled attacks on Conservative immigration laws, implemented their
own racist laws after 1964. As a sop to their leftwing supporters, and perhaps to their own
consciences, they coupled these with largely ineﬀective anti-discriminatory race relations
acts. It must be said, however, that they were subject to self-delusion, rather than active
racist sentiment (which of course they abhorred !). Equally, they were by no means totally
in thrall to populist sentiment. If they had been, the Wilson government would never have
undertaken homosexual law reform and abolished capital punishment. Glennerster
discusses the former thoroughly in a useful chapter on ‘Morality, family and the state ’, but
the latter gets only a passing mention. Naturally, with a work of this nature, it is diﬃcult to
please all readers. The failure to discuss penal policy in more depth, though, does appear to
be a signiﬁcant ﬂaw. Perhaps this will be corrected in the next edition. In all, Glennerster’s
book will be a valuable addition to many university libraries, and it is to be hoped that it
will ﬁnd a wide readership.
Noel Whiteside and Robert Salais’s edited collection reminds us that diﬃculties in
producing ‘rational ’ political solutions to economic and social problems have not been
restricted to Britain. One should not, perhaps, need to state this fact, but the traditional
self-deprecatory tendency in the writing of British economic history has frequently
obscured it. A lurking belief in the axiom of British inferiority is present, perhaps, even in
this generally sensible and worthwhile volume. While the editors stress that their analysis
cannot be interpreted as a blanket criticism of British policies, the overall drift of their
introduction is that French collectivism promoted ‘modernization’, and hence economic
growth, far more successfully than did the British ‘voluntarist ’ tradition. Not all of the
thirteen chapters seem, however, to bear this out fully.
To begin with, one notes the similarities, as much as the diﬀerences, of the two countries’
experiences. Michel Magairaz’s opening chapter, ‘Companies under public control in
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France, 1900–1950’, provides some of the material for the comparison. In France, as in
Britain, the somewhat patchy introduction of state control during the First World War was
followed by the instinct to return to normalcy – albeit with the role of the state increased to
some degree. Both countries’ governments made eﬀorts to promote rationalization in the
1920s. The French were somewhat quicker to undertake nationalizations, an ‘ illusory
policy of ‘‘ transport co-ordination’’ ’ being followed by a late 1930s state takeover of the
railways when they proved unproﬁtable (p. 38). But, as in Britain after 1945, nationaliz-
ations were concentrated in the transport and energy sectors. The post-war Trente Glorieuses
paralleled the British so-called ‘golden age ’ of aﬄuence. This is not to play down the
signiﬁcant diﬀerences of culture, economic structure, and policy outcomes that did exist. It
is merely to note that claims of exceptionalism (whether British or French) need to be
treated with caution.
Similarly, it is necessary to tread carefully when seeking to attribute Britain’s economic
problems to the failure to emulate foreign models suﬃciently. Chapters by Nick Tiratsoo
and Jonathan Zeitlin cast diﬀering light on this issue, through the lens of
‘Americanization’. As Tiratsoo shows, the Attlee government can hardly be convicted of
lack of interest in American productivity-enhancing methods, and in industrial ‘modern-
ization’ more generally. The key ﬁgure was Sir Staﬀord Cripps (president of the Board
of Trade, 1945–7, and chancellor of the exchequer, 1947–50). Eﬃciency was his
obsession – understandably, given Britain’s dire economic situation. He helped sponsor
the Anglo-American Productivity Council (AACP), which took employers, managers, and
workers on study tours of the USA. The participants returned enthusiastic, but the
practical consequences of the productivity drive that followed were limited. Tiratsoo
concludes :
Most of the government’s policies were both well constructed and appropriate. … On the other hand,
convincing the balance of employers to change proved far from easy. British business had emerged
from the war in oﬀensive mood and meant to re-create a ‘ free ’ private enterprise system at all costs.
The public remained uninterested. Labour could, therefore, only persuade and exhort.
(p. 69)
Zeitlin’s arguments, however, suggest that things were not so simple. He agrees that the
government pushed Americanization, but is less certain about its beneﬁts. Whereas
Tiratsoo focuses on management issues, Zeitlin concentrates on eﬀorts to get British in-
dustry to adopt US-style mass production methods. (To this degree, their respective
chapters do not contradict one another directly.) He argues that British businessmen and
engineers were well aware of the potential advantages of mass production, but that many
were equally aware of the diﬃculties of imposing standard designs on varied export mar-
kets and of relying too much on a narrow range of products under rapidly changing
competitive conditions. In a forceful conclusion, he notes that British ﬁrms did, after the
mid-1950s, change their working practices. ‘Far from reviving its competitive fortunes,
however, this putative Americanization of British engineering was associated instead with a
rapid loss of market share both abroad and at home, resulting in a steep decline of domestic
production and employment ’ (p. 119). This note of scepticism is highly refreshing.
Another interesting contrast is between Keith Burgess’s contribution, on the technical
training of youth in Britain, and Franc¸oise Birck’s chapter, on the training of engineers in
Lorraine between 1890 and 1956. Burgess notes that earlier interpretations of the interwar
period as one of ‘missed opportunities ’ in terms of innovative policy-making fail to do
justice to the eﬀorts of the Board of Education. He shows that the Board of Education
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successfully intervened to improve the state of training in the West Midlands, although this
was a long and exhausting process, and was not replicated elsewhere. He argues that
the Board’s diﬃculties were not rooted in any lack of determination on its part nor in subordination to
an anti-industrial or anti-technological ideology. Rather, they sprang, ﬁrst, from the reluctance of
industrial and commercial interests to support its claims to scarce resources and, second, from its
relative impotence in relation both to the local authorities and other central government departments.
(p. 150)
Birck’s chapter indicates the drawbacks that greater success might have brought, however.
During the interwar years, the Lorraine technical institutes appeared to be producing
engineers at an excessive rate. Signiﬁcant numbers of their graduates found themselves
jobless, and many ex-students had to accept employment bearing little relationship to the
levels of their qualiﬁcations. The book contains several other valuable contributions, no-
tably Simon Deakin’s on British employment contracts, and Philippe-Jean Hesse on
French social security. It is to be regretted, however, that – apart from the in-
troduction – none of the chapters deals with France and Britain in parallel.
Together with the other works under review, the volume highlights not only how hard it
is for politicians and oﬃcials to formulate and implement ‘ rational ’ policies, but also that
rationality is only one of a number of criteria by which policies need to be judged. When
judging politicians’ policies it is important to remember that MPs represent not only the
interests of their constituents, but also their desires. And experience teaches us that many
people have desires that conﬂict, often quite strongly, with their ostensible interests. There
are of course some areas where voters may, as it were, legitimately prefer non-rational
solutions. Politicians and civil servants cannot always presume to know best, even –
perhaps especially – when it comes to the spending of public money. There are some
areas, however, where the prejudices of the voters ought not to be pandered to in any
circumstances. Racial discrimination is an obvious example.
Overall, though, perhaps we need to broaden our concept of political rationality. It is, of
course, important that we should evaluate the logical consistency of political programmes
and actions, but a mere ‘marks out of ten ’ approach is not enough. We need to take into
account the instrumental value of politicians’ stated principles. It is not that ideas are merely
weapons in the battle for oﬃce; but even ideas that are sincerely held end up being used as
weapons in that battle, and to some degree adapted for that purpose. Nor should we
necessarily regret this. If it is desirable that politicians have ideals, it is also desirable that
they try to make the policies that encapsulate them appeal to as wide a constituency as
possible. This process involves compromise and some necessary imprecision; it is carried
out on the basis of imperfect information; and it involves instinct as well as reason.
Therefore, politicians’ descriptions of what they will ideally do cannot correspond com-
pletely with reality, or even, absolutely, with their own intentions. As Gaitskell suggested,
then, politicians’ continual simpliﬁcation and lack of deep thinking is to a great extent
inevitable. This being the case, we should recognize also the inevitability that muddled
outcomes will often result. To adapt some words of Max Weber, only those who in the face
of this can say ‘In spite of all ! ’ have the calling for the study of politics.
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